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Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage of Obscenity
Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod
Henry P. Monaghan*
In a widely admired article, Harry Kalven argued that the New
York Times case' embodies the "central meaning" of the First Amend-
ment. On his view, in a free, open society, maximum protection must
be accorded to "political" speech.2 He concluded that the right freely
to criticize the government must lie at the center of any adequate theory
of the First Amendment.3
It is not so easy to make a comparable claim about the relationship
between obscenity and the First Amendment. The Supreme Court's
conception of obscenity is partially responsible. While the Court in
Roth v. United States (1957) explicitly barred "obscenity" from the
protection of the First Amendment, it defined the term so that only a
marginal class of writings warranted the label.4 Obscenity was given
enough precision so that obscenity prosecutions were unlikely to result
in the loss of much of value, a result which was reinforced by the
Court's parallel concern with local enforcement methods-a First
Amendment due process, if you will.i In this respect, the 1966 obscenity
Assoc. Professor of Law, Boston University. BA. 1955, University of Massachusetts;
LL.B. 1958, Yale University; LL.M. 1960, Harvard University.
[1.] New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
[2.] Kalven, The New York Times: A Note On "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. C. REv. 191; see also KALvrN, Tnm NECnO &ND TM Fmsr
A i ,mxaFNTr 52-64 (1965); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meildejohn interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14-20 (1965); Karst, The First Amend-
ment and Harry Kalven, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1 (1965).
[3.] Cf. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966): "Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."
[4.] Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155,
158 n.2 (2d Cir. 1965), contains a chronology of the Supreme Courts obscenity and oensor-
ship rulings from 1957 to 1965.
[5.] See, e.g., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Manual Enterprizes, Inc. v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478, 495-519 (1962) (concurring opinion). Many of the recent decisions in-
volved movie censorship, and from Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 355 U.S. 35, reversing
244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957), they culminated in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965); see also Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259 (1965),
reversing 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E2d 242 (1964). Moreover, in the free speech context, the
Court has vigorously enforced the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. E.g., A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). In holding invalid a warrant authorizing a search
for books possessed in violation of a Texas anti-subversive statute, the Court, in Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965), recognized the dose association between the First and
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decisions, Memoirs v. Massachusetts,6 Ginzburg v. United States7 and
Mishkin v. New York,8 do not appear to portend fundamental changes.
Attempts to suppress Eros, The Housewife's Handbook on Selective
Promiscuity, and Mr. Mishkin's collection of So Firm So Fully Packed
and The Strap Returns, etc., are not to be equated with the attempted
suppression of Lady Chatterly's Lover, Memoirs of Hecate County or
Strange Fruit, all of which felt the censors' crushing heel but a few
short years ago.0 Nor is the literary importance of Edmund Wilson and
Lillian Smith likely to be confused with that of Ralph Ginzburg and
Edward Mishkin. Obscenity litigation in 1966 remains concerned with
writings of little or no importance, as it has for nearly a decade.
The foregoing analysis is, however, unsatisfying. Many people have
no desire whatever to read Ulysses or Memoirs of Hecate County;
their tastes run to Eros or The Strap Returns. And the 1966 decisions,
even more than Roth, permit the state severely to restrict their reading
fare. The existence of this governmental power of suppression demands
explanation in any coherent "general theory" of the First Amendment.10
Before 1966 the crucial question in obscenity prosecutions centered
on the book itself; was it obscene per se?"1 The new rulings have added
another category-a form of variable obscenity or obscenity per quod
-books assumed not to be obscene per se but which because of extrinsic
facts ("the circumstances of production, sale and publicity") may be
treated as such. The question is whether obscenity doctrine, vintage
1966, can be reconciled with the First Amendment.
I. Obscenity and a "General Theory" of the First Amendment
Though others disagree, I think that in terms of result Roth stands
as one of the liberal hallmarks in Supreme Court history. The impor-
tant question there was not whether obscenity would be sheltered by
the First Amendment, but rather how broadly that term would be
Fourth Amendments, saying that "the constitutional requirement that warrants must
particularly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous ex.
actitude when the 'things' are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which
they contain."
[6.] 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
[7.] 383 U.S. 463 (1966).E8.] 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
9.] People v. Doubleday & Co., 297 N.Y. 687 (1947), affd by an equally divided Court,
335 U.S. 848 (1948) (Memoirs of Hecate County); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 MUss.
543 (1945) (Strange Fruit).
[10.] See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 938 (1963).
[I1.] This was true despite the fact that the issue of the books usually arose In the
context of a criminal prosecution.
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defined. It is on this point, I think, that Roth is a liberal bulwark. In
an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan, the Court explicitly rejected the
view of The Queen v. Hicklin,'2 which allowed the obscene character
of a book to be judged by the effect of isolated excerpts upon partic-
ularly susceptible persons-a standard which would threaten much
serious literature. The First Amendment barred such a definition, said
Mr. Justice Brennan, because it protects works unless they are "utterly
without redeeming social importance."13 Thus, at a minimum, any book
possessing literary, artistic or scientific value could not be classified as
obscene, whatever its erotic characteristics. Moreover, Justice Brennan
refused to measure obscenity by the impact of isolated passages on the
particularly susceptible. Rather, the inquiry must be:
whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest.14
Soon thereafter Justices Harlan and Stewart added a third ingredient
to the constitutional definition of obscenity: books could not be pro-
nounced obscene unless they were patently offensive-"so offensive on
their face as to affront community standards of decency."' 5
[12.1 [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371.
[13.1 354 U.S. at 484.
[14.] Id. at 489. This standard was, of course, not invented out of whole doth. See. eg..
United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, supra
note 9, at 551-52. Indeed, by the time of Roth, The Queen v. Hidin had in substance
already been rejected by the Supreme Court itself. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1957), invalidating a Michigan obscenity statute which, in essence, measured ohscenity
by what was fit reading for children.
[15.] Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion was concurred in only by Mr. Justice Stemart, the remainingjustices deciding the case on different grounds. But Mir. Justice Harlan's view quickly be-
came accepted dogma. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (opinion of Bren-
nan, J.). Later AMr. Justice Harlan elaborated his thesis, arguing that a "community cannot,
where liberty of speech and press are at issue, condemn that which it generally tolerates."
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 171 (1959) (concurring opinion). Since the additional crit-
erion of "patent offensiveness" further restricted the state's power to suppress, it has rightly
been viewed as a "liberal" contribution. But Mr. Justice Douglas' admonition in Roth
bears repetition:
Any test that turns on what is offensive to the community's standards is too loose,
too capricious, too destructive of freedom of expression to be squared with the
First Amendment .... This is community censorship in one of its worst forms.
It creates a regime where in the battle between the literate and the Philistines, the
Philistines are certain to win.
354 U.S. at 512. This is particularly true in the area of sex, because of the double standard
the average man holds in this regard. "There are few topics on which the public and the
private views of a person are so likely to diverge." Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law
of Obscenity, 1960 Su'. Cr. RErv. 1, 45. Accordingly, "The possibility that deliberatingjurors would be uncommonly sanctimonious or hypocritical seems quite obvious."
United States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 169.
I find no support for the view recently expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Chemline,
Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1966), that "appeal to prurient
interests" and "patent offensiveness" are equivalent concepts.
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The crucial result of Roth seems to me beyond contradiction. No
serious, complex work may be suppressed as obscene. But result is one
thing, and adequacy of opinion quite another. The Court scarcely made
an attempt to reconcile governmental power to repress obscenity with
a comprehensive theory of the First Amendment. Nor, as a substitute,
did it even construct a "special" theory for obscenity adequate to
resolve future obscenity problems.
The inadequacy of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Roth becomes
evident from its context. When the case was in the court of appeals,10
Judge Frank, in an elaborate and learned concurring opinion, ques-
tioned whether obscenity prosecutions could on principle be reconciled
with the First Amendment. He particularly attacked the assumption
that obscenity triggered anti-social conduct, and argued that the sup-
porting evidence was far too insubstantial to justify suppression.11
Framed in these terms, the constitutional question presented to the
Supreme Court was most difficult: why could speech be repressed where
there was no solid basis for believing that it caused immediate harm?
This question raises the sharpest problems of the relationship between
the legislature and the Court on civil liberties questions. A legislative
finding that obscenity is harmful might fairly be inferred from the
pervasiveness of obscenity legislation. But, as Dennis v. United States18
held, a legislative finding of harm cannot be conclusive on the courts
in First Amendment cases, for then the First Amendment would exist
only at legislative sufferance. Rather, speech may be suppressed only
after a judicial determination that it presents a clear and probable
danger of serious harm.19 And Judge Frank demonstrated that on the
available evidence, obscenity legislation failed this test.
[16.] 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956).
[17.1 Id. at 801-27. See also Judge Frank's opinion in Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d
788, 790-98 (2d Cir. 1949). And see the opinion of Judge Bok in Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1949). But see United States v.
Klaw, supra note 4, at 163: "We do not doubt that 'obscenity' may be regulated because
it is thought to incite antisocial sexual behavior and crime." See also id. at 165 n.1l.
(18.] 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
[19.] Id. at 505-08. There was no opinion for the Court, but the plurality opinion of
Chief Justice Vinson for himself and Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton, expressly rejects
the rule in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), that the courts are bound by a
legislative determination that a class of speech tends to yield antisocial consequences,
unless the determination is irrational. Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in Dennis,
likewise repudiated the Gitlow rule. 341 U.S. at 579-92. Mr. Justice Clark did not partici-
pate in the Dennis decision.
However, Dennis and subsequent decisions have left uncertain the precise role of
legislative findings in the First Amendment area. See generally Karst, Legislative Facts it
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 75; Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 637 (1966). For another aspect of the
general problem of the importance of legislative findings in constitutional litigation,
see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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The Supreme Court responded that Judge Frank had been asking
the wrong questions. Obscenity, wrote Mr. Justice Brennan, is unpro-
tected by the First Amendment not because it is harmful, but because
it is worthless:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guar-
anties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited
area of more important interests. But implict in the history of the
First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance.20
Judge Frank's impressive analysis was thus neatly laid to one side. But
Justice Brennan's reply is perhaps a little too tidy.2'
In excluding obscenity from the shelter of the First Amendment,
Justice Brennan resorted to what Professor Kalven has aptly termed
a "two-level" theory of speech 22-certain classes of speech are within
the protection of the First Amendment and certain classes are not.
Justice Brennan sought to identify obscenity with other excluded classes
of speech. He quoted from Mr. Justice Murphy's opinion in Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire:2
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
The amicus briefs of the American Civil Liberties Union have always taken the posi-
tion that obscenity cannot be suppressed absent a showing of a dear and present danger
of actual harm. The Union recognizes that, as a practical matter, its position means no
suppression. See, e-g., Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, p. 9 n.11, Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
f20.] 354 US. at 484. Mr. Justice Brennan sought to buttress this position with an
historical argument, id. at 482-83, but his effort has been roundly criticized. See, e.g.,
Kalven, supra note 15, at 9; Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 428-31 (concurring
opinion of Douglas, J.).
[21.] It should be noted here that speech put beyond the First Amendment is not
thereby stripped of all constitutional protection. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that all governmental action be rationally related
to some valid governmental end. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500, 502 (1960)(concurring opinions); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500, 503 (1964). No such end
served by repressing speech simply because it lacks redeeming social value. There must
be some basis for believing the speech to be harmful, as false advertising is presumably
harmful. Accordingly, it could be argued that the Fifth, if not the First, Amendment
bars suppression of obscenity. To this analysis, there is, I think, a complete answer.
Under familiar due process principles, those challenging an obscenity statute must show
that the legislature could not rationally conclude that obscenity directly causes anti-
social conduct. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); ee generally
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial,
1962 Sup. Cr. RFv. 34. On the present evidence, I doubt that such a showing is possible.
Cf. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 441, 451-54 (Clark, J., dissenting). See also
discussion accompanying notes 16-19, supra.
[22.] Kalven, supra note 15, at 10-11.
[23.] 315 US. 568 (1942).
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thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, [the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or "fighting words"-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace]. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.24
Interestingly, Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion omits the bracketed
material from his quotation. But the omitted material is instructive,
because it demonstrates that, even assuming the validity of the two-level
theory, obscenity is not in fact comparable to the other classes of
excluded speech. The comparison of obscenity with "fighting words"
is unpersuasive, since fighting words in their nature provide a clear
and present danger of social harm; they are "inseparably locked
with action," as Professor Emerson notes.28 Nor is the reference to
libel more persuasive. Arguably at least, libel, like fighting words,
tends to inflict instantaneous, irredeemable harm; it leaves no time for
counter-argument and for that reason may be discouraged.20 Moreover,
the bounds of what may constitutionally be characterized as libel are
being constantly narrowed.27 In any event, the classes of speech other
than obscenity referred to by Mr. Justice Murphy seem positively
harmful. Accordingly, they provide weak scaffolding for any theory that
obscenity is beyond the First Amendment simply because it is worthless.
Second, the term "without social importance" is imprecise, and seems
insufficient to rationalize all the classes of speech which the Court has
held fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. Commercial
promotion of goods and services is denied First Amendment protec-
tion,28 but no one thinks that commercial speech lacks social value.
[24.1 Id. at 571-72. The italics appear in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion, 854 U.S.
at 485.
[25.] Emerson, supra note 10, at 932. "Fighting words" (insults and vituperation on a
face-to-face level) might have been reconciled with the traditional formulation by treating
them as words which "have all the effect of force," Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1918), or expressions "so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparablepart of it," Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 514 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
[26.] Emerson, supra note 10, at 922.
[27.1 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S,
64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1; see also Ashton v. Kentucky,
384 U.S. 195 (1966).
[28.] The leading case is Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Breard
v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). See generally Comment, Freedom of Expression
in a Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. RFy. 1191 (1965). In Ginzburg, Mr. Justice Brennan
analogized the commercial exploitation of sex to the buying and selling of merchandise.
"Material sold solely to produce sexual arousal, like commercial advertising, does not
132
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The reply seems to be that commercial speech plays "no essential part
in the exposition of ideas"; and ideas relating to the buying or selling
of goods are not "ideas" in the constitutional sense. So the social value
test relates not simply to the exchange of ideas, but to the exchange of
certain types of ideas, principally those related to the art of self-govern-
ment.-9
But the exclusion of speech not related to the exposition of ideas
rests on too limited a conception of the purposes of the First Amend-
ment. To be sure, the First Amendment is centrally concerned with
protecting the untrammeled flow of political and social ideas. But
Mr. Justice Brennan recognized in Roth and subsequent decisions that
the First Amendment protects art and literature as well,3 0 although
the "people do not need novels or dramas or paintings or poems because
they will be called upon to vote."31 Freedom of expression is, as Pro-
fessor Emerson notes, necessarily concerned not just with public
matters, but with private life, with self-fulfillment as well as self-govern-
ment.3
2
Third, if the First Amendment excludes what is worthless, the
standard of review for determining obscenity should be articulated in
those terms, and those terms alone. But the Roth test turns on some-
thing altogether different-the prurient appeal of the challenged
publication. Nowhere did the Roth Court explain how the prurient
and social value tests related to one another. The result was that until
1966 it was impossible to say whether social value was a separate crite-
rion, or merely some aspect or other of the prurient appeal standard.
Most authorities came to believe that the two categories were indepen-
dent.33 Such, at least, is the import of Mr. Justice Brennan's insistence
escape regulation because it has been dressed up as speech, or in other contexts mightbe recognized as speech." 383 U.S. at 474 n.17. See Comment, supra, at 1194-95.
The opinion which the Court offers in support of ... [Valentine] can be justified
oly on the theory that the Constitution values freedom of political propaganda more
ighlyta it alues the fedom t ori oopetion by means of trade ....[his theory] is nowhere expresse in the Constitution ... [which] does not dis-
criminate between different liberties. It leaves all liberties to compete for men's
allegiance in a free field. In that competition the salesman has the same opportunity
as the preacher, the scientist, the engineer, the soldier, and the politician ....
Gardner, Free Speech in Public Places, 36 B.U.L. REy. 239, 246-47 (1956).
t29.] See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484: The protection given speech and press was fashionedto assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people." See also the materials cited supra note 2.[30.] 354 U.S. at 487; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1963).[31.] Kalven, supra note 15, at 16. See also Chafee, Booli ReView, 62 1-Mv. L REV.
891, 897 (1949).
[32.) Emerson, supra note 10, at 879-81. See also Comment, supra note 28.[33.) In the 1966 obscenity cases all the parties and the courts below proceeded on the
assumption that the constitutional standard required the Government to show: (1) prurient
appeal, (2) patent offensiveness, and (3) no redeeming social value.
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in a later case that material having "any... form of social importance
... may not be branded as obscenity,"34 apparently without regard to
how pruriently appealing it is. But at least two other Justices still
interpret Roth to make pruriency decisive and value irrelevant; other-
wise, says Mr. Justice Clark in the Fanny Hill case, Roth gives "the
smut artist free rein to carry on his dirty business."35 Given such dis.
agreements among the Justices over what Roth really held, it is probably
best to say that Roth simply left the issue up in the air.
Finally, even if obscenity is itself unprotected speech, it is a term
of considerable vagueness. In Roth vagueness was a principal constitu-
tional argument: not only do obscenity statutes fail to give notice of
what conduct is proscribed, but their vagueness infringes heavily on
First Amendment interests by encouraging censors' attempts to suppress
protected speech. The Court frankly conceded that obscenity was by
no means a precise term. 36 But it accepted a measure of vagueness here
that it had refused to tolerate anywhere else in the First Amendment
area.37 The Court recognized that it was not dealing with a simple,
colorless problem of "worthless" speech, but with a problem about
which there are deep-and-irrational feelings. Its sole response (albeit an
important one) was that only materials "utterly without redeeming
social importance" could be suppressed.88
In sum, Roth insulates from prosecution any serious or complex
work, and is therefore a contribution of considerable importance. But
Roth does not fit obscenity prosecutions within any general theory of
,the First Amendment; the social value test does not provide an adequate
,explanation either historically or on principle. And in no event does
,the social value test explain why speech dealing with sex alone
[34.] Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 30, at 191.
[35.] 383 U.S. at 441 (dissenting opinion); cf. White, J., dissenting, in Fanny lill,
id. at 461.
[36.] 354 U.S. at 491-92.
[37.] In Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729-31 (1961), the Court noted that
the "complexity of the test fashioned in [Roth]" required discriminations of the most
sensitive nature, and were wholly inconsistent with broad, clumsy local police enforce-
ment techniques. See also People v. Kimmel, - Ill.2d -, 217 N.E.2d 785, 786
(1966); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v,
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
[38.] It is interesting to note that the Court has been unwiling to accept "novel" or
new" definitions of obscenity. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519 (1948); see Bmrs,
FREEDOm, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38-39 (pb. ed. 1964). And the Court has
refused to accept analogous terminology as constitutionally sufficient. For example, stan.
dards such as "sacrilegious," "immoral," "tending to corrupt morals," "harmful," and
"prejudicial to the best interests of the people of [the] ... City," have all been invalidated.
Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Gelling v. Texas, 343 US.
960 (1952); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). It is, in fact, most doubtful
"whether any standard other than obscenity could stand the Constitutional test." United
States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 163.
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shoulders the burden of showing that it is not worthless. Moreover,
,the Roth approach to obscenity focuses exclusively on the nature of the
publication itself. By not addressing itself to such questions as why a
distinction should be drawn between public and private obscenity, or
between commercial exploitation of sex and the sale of the same
material for scientific study,39 the Court simply postponed to another
day problems which cannot be adequately resolved within the simple
per se framework of Roth.
The 1966 obscenity cases mark a recognition of Roth's inadequacies
and the beginnings of a recasting of doctrine. Does the revamped doc-
trinal structure fit more easily into a comprehensive theory of the First
Amendment? Any answer must begin by assessing the possible govern-
mental interests in suppressing obscenity. Probably no single purpose
underlies obscenity legislation. Like most legislation, obscenity laws
rest on views and policies which are not only inarticulate but imper-
fectly understood. Nonetheless, three kinds of state policies may be
distinguished for the sake of analysis.
1. The Nuisance Interest
Public sexual conduct may offend community sensibilities, and few,
if any, doubt the state's power to prosecute public indecency or public
exposure. It has been suggested that obscenity prosecutions vindicate
similar interests, that offensive and aggressive marketing of sexually
arousing materials is a "nuisance."40 This analysis has something to
commend it, and is reflected in part in the 1966 decisions."' But it
hardly explains the pervasive character of obscenity legislation that
generally makes no distinction between publicly and privately dis-
[39.] For example, assume a book is declared obscene in a decision affirmed by the
Supreme Court. An accredited institution purchases the book as part of scientiic or
sociological investigation. Such sales would be characterized as outside the purpose of the
obscenity statute, e.g., United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350, 357-58 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); see also Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966). But could either the seller
or the buyer constitutionally be prosecuted for this conduct? The answer is generally
assumed to be no. But if this is the answer, is prosecution precluded because the material
is not obscene in this context? see Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core
Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene? 7 UTAH L. REv. 289, 298-302 (1951). Or is prorecu-
tion precluded because in certain contexts obscenity is constitutionally protected? Schwartz,
Mforals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm. L. R v. 669. 679-80 (1963). The
1966 obscenity cases do not answer these questions.
[40.] See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 10, at 938-39; Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the
Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. R v. 834, 847 (1964). The brief filed in Ginzburg v.
United States, supra note 7, by the Authors League of America Inc., p. 5, argued that
obscenity statutes may not be applied "where a book or other publication-regardless
of content-is sold to adults and where it is published and disseminated in a manner that
does not invade the right of privacy of individual citizens."
[41.] Cf. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. at 470.
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eminated erotica, or between invited and uninvited commercial ex-
ploitation. It is, after all, one thing to prevent a man from being
accosted on the public streets by a seller of erotica; it is quite another
matter when that man is a customer who enters the seller's bookstore
or answers his ad. In this context the nuisance argument is trivial. 42
Moreover, a nuisance analysis does not jibe with the Roth per se ap-
proach, which focuses simply upon the book itself, not its manner of
dissemination.
2. Anti-Social Conduct
The time-honored rationale for censorship asserts that obscenity
triggers anti-social conduct, particularly violent crimes. As Judge Frank
observed, this proposition has never found substantial evidentiary
support.43 To be sure, Mr. Justice Clark believes that such evidence
does exist, but he concedes that opinion is divided on the point, and an
examination of his affirmative sources-which include J. Edgar Hoover
and Cardinal Spellman-is unpersuasive.44 The evidence in favor of a
direct, immediate connection between obscenity and criminal behavior
is no more compelling now than when Judge Frank wrote his concur-
rence. Indeed, in the 1966 cases, the United States made no attempt to
argue the point, contenting itself to say that opinion is "sharply divided"
on the question; 4 the excellent brief for the State of New York dis-
avowed any reliance on the supposed connection.40 And some argue
that obscenity is not only harmless, but it has "redeeming social im-
portance" by providing a harmless escape for sexual frustrations-it
dissipates rather than unleashes anti-social acts. 47
3. Preservation of Character
Finally, the state may seek to prevent the long-range effect of ob-
scenity on character. The argument is not that obscenity generates
immediate anti-social conduct, but that, like group libel, it has an
[42.] See Kalven, supra note 15, at 42.
[43.] In addition to Judge Frank's impressive opinion in Roth, 237 F2d 795, 801 (2d
Cir. 1956), see, e.g., THE INSTITUTE FOR SEX RESEARCH, INC., SEX OFFENDERS 126-27, 669-92
(1965); Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 655 (1964); Cairns, Paul
& Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical
Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009 (1962). A recent murder trial in England has stirred
considerable interest in the question whether obscenity triggers crime. See N.Y. Times,
June 12, 1966, Literary Supplement, p. 8.
[44.] Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 451-54 (dissenting opinion).
[45.] Brief for Respondent, p. 15, Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 7.
[46.] Brief for Appellee, pp. 64-66, Mishkin v. New York, supra note 8.
[47.] See Murphy, supra note 43, at 660-61; E. KRONHAUSEN & P. KRONHAI1SEN, PORNOG-
RAPHY AND THE L4,w 273-74 (1959).
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insidious effect on character, gradually predisposing individuals toward
deviant conduct, sexual or otherwise.48
The "character" analysis was first advanced by Mr. Justice Harlan in
Roth,49 and it is the subject of a stimulating article by Professor Louis
Henkin.50 There are, however, significant differences between the two
arguments. Justice Harlan seems impressed with the state's interest in
the prevention of character change because of its possible long-range
effect on conduct. But even if obscenity can alter character, so can
innumerable other stimuli, and Justice Harlan does not explain why
the state has a peculiar interest in shielding character from change
through obscene expression alone. Nor is his analysis consistent with
Kingsley Pictures v. New York, 51 where the Court vetoed New York's
attempt to bar a showing of Lady Chatterly's Lover because it depicted
adultery as desirable conduct under the circumstances. Mr. Justice
Stewart wrote that New York had "struck at the very heart of constitu-
tionally protected liberty" in attempting to shield the character of its
citizens from change through exposure to attacks on present standards.5
Presumably, therefore, the First Amendment protects a direct appeal
for character change which falls short of incitement to specific conduct,
and there is very little evidence that the obscenity directly incites to
action.53
Professor Henkin pushes the analysis considerably further. He argues
that obscenity legislation is designed to shield character from corrupting
influences, not because such change would ultimately result in pro-
scribable conduct, but because communities seek to preserve the tradi-
tional morality.54 What is more, Professor Henkin is satisfied that the
traditional morality is quasi-religious in origin, and he is concerned
[48.] See KALLvE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14. A related but somewhat different con-
cept stresses the impact of obscenity on personality. Obscene materials are said to create
feelings of shame, guilt and morbidity; thus, they constitute a source of psychological
tension and anxiety. Cf. MoDEr. P.NA CODE, § 207.10 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), pp. 5 et seq.
At present, the evidence in support of this view is insubstantial. See Cairns, Paul &
Wishner, supra note 43, at 1031-34; and see note 47 supra. Such a weakly supported
"mental health" argument does not seem sufficient as an independent basis for prep ing
speech except, perhaps, to the extent that speech may be suppressed to promote "char-
acter."
[49.] 354 U.S. at 502.[50.] Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUNI. L Ra'.
391 (1963).
[51.] 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
[52.] Id. at 688.[53.] See Kalven, supra note 15, at 28-30.
[54.] Henkin, supra note 50, at 395. Compare Bmxs, op. cit. supra note 38, which,
following Plato and Aristotle, argues that the aim of the State is to develop virtuous
citizens and that the First Amendment is wrongly interpreted if construed to deny the
state power to promote the moral development of its citizens.
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that the legislation violates our concepts of separation of church and
state as well as freedom of speech. 5
From these premises Professor Henkin concludes that discussion of
obscenity has focused on the wrong issues. For him, the issue is substan-
tive due process, not free speech: can the state enforce the morality of
the community without showing that this enforcement serves some
independent, "utilitarian" aim?56 He suggests that it cannot.57
I do not find Professor Henkin's analysis persuasive. It may be con-
ceded that much morals legislation, including obscenity legislation, was
not and is not passed for "utilitarian ends," but as Professor Henkin
recognizes, "If the challenge had been seriously pressed, some utilitarian
reason for these laws might have been found."' 8 Most, if not all, morals
legislation, including that relating to obscenity, can be assigned reasons
falling within an accepted "utilitarian" framework. Mr. Henkin's only
response is that these reasons "would have been rationalizations and
might have been recognized as such."5' 9 This is no answer, unless we
are willing to abandon the "minimum rationality" standard of due
process cases,60 and to permit the Court, in the fashion of Lochner v.
New York, 61 to pass on the "real" purposes of the legislation.
Moreover, even if we were to structure the question baldly in terms
of the state's power to enforce the secular morality, is it not rational for
a community to decide to enforce that morality so as to preserve the
community's moral cohesiveness?6 2 Following Mill, some liberals sug-
[55.] Henkin, supra note 50, at 407-11.
[56.] Id. at 392, 395-401.
[57.] His argument is that the "consumer of private immorality" may be constitu-
tionally protected so long as there is no showing of danger to others, Id. at 401-07. The
ancient property maxim, sic utere tuo, is resurrected as the appropriate limitation on
governmental power restricting individual liberty. Id. at 403. Professor Henkin might
also have observed that generally
there has been no legislative attempt to suppress publication on the ground that
a book might impair moral standards by the depiction, or advocacy, of cruelty,
avarice, dishonesty or cowardice. The sexual virtue is the only virtue on whose behalf
we are asked to give up the right of free expression in art or literature. The statutes
do not seek suppression in the interest of honesty, kindness or courage.
Supplemental Brief of Appellants, pp. 2-3, Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra note 6.
[58.] Henkin, supra note 50, at 404.E59.1 Ibid.
[60.] See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., supra note 21; Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949). See also Karst, supra note 19, at 86-88; McCloskey,
supra note 21.
[61.] 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
[62.] See EUGENE Rosrow, THE SOVEPRGN PREROGATIVE 68-69 (1962). See also Dworkin,
Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986, 1003-04 (1966). As Pro.
fessor Henkin recognizes, the Supreme Court has traditionally assumed that the states
have wide power in the areas of moral legislation, although, as he points out, no
distinction between "public" and "private" conduct seems to have been considered.
See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818
(1880). In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 510, 515 (1947), the Court said:
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gest that it is improper for government to interfere with individual
liberty except to restrain conduct threatening others.03 But the Con-
stitution no more enacts Mill's Essay on Liberty than it did Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics. Professor Henkin recognizes that the state may
"promote general economic or social welfare."04 To what end? To
promote the dignity and full development of its citizens. Does the con-
stitution, then, forbid the state to promote-even define-virtue among
its citizens? I think not. With Mr. Justice Douglas, "I assume there is
nothing in the constitution which forbids [a state] from using its power
.. . to proscribe conduct on the grounds of good morals." 60 1
Unlike most other "morals" legislation, however, obscenity involves
not conduct, but speech.60 And whatever the state's interest, the state
Acts of gross and open indecency or obscenity, injurious to public morals, are
indictable at common law, as violative of the public policy that requires from the
offender retribution for acts that flaunt accepted standards of conduct. . ..When
a legislative body concludes that the mores of the community call for an extension
of the impermissible limits, an enactment aimed at the evil is plainly within its
power, if it does not transgress the boundaries fixed by the Constitution for freedom
of expression.
See also, Harlan, J., dissenting, in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-6 (1961). See gen-
erally BEaNs, op. cit. supra note 58. But there are limits on the state's power to enforce
the secular morality-at least as to the methods of enforcement chosen. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
,63.] Mr. Justice Holmes stated the position most succinctly: "For the most part, the
purpose of the criminal law is only to induce external conformity to rule." Hou-ar,
TnE COMMON IAW 49 (1881). But see BemNs, op. cit. supra note 38.
[64.] Henkin, supra note 50.
[65.] Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 512 (dissenting opinion) (italics in original).
Mr. Justice Douglas' statement was made in reference to Congressional power over the
mails, but he seems to have viewed it as having general applicability.
[66.] I do not believe that those who analyzed obscenity in terms of free speech rather
than substantive due process erred. To be sure, obscenity, like all "morals" legislation,
presents questions of substantive due process. But under traditional conceptions of due
process the questions do not seem to me difficult. On the basis of the present evidence,
I think that a legislature could rationally believe that obscenity triggers anti-social con-
duct, both immediately and in the long run, contributes to psychosexual tensions harmful
to mental health, and diverts the reader from more socially beneficial concerns. For me,
that is the end of the due process argument. Professor Henkin seems to me to be sug-
gesting that the minimum rationality standard of the regulatory cases be abandoned in
favor of a standard approaching that obtaining in the First Amendment area. Broadly
stated, that standard is a "balancing" one, and, in essence, requires that legislation
significantly impinging on First Amendment interests be narrowly drawn to meet the
specific evil, and that the evil to be corrected be a substantial one. There are, however,
some who believe that this "balancing" test should apply only to so-called "indirect"
restrictions on speech and not to "direct" or "pure" speech, the latter being suppressible
only upon a showing of dear and present danger. See Black, J., dissenting, in Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 141 (1959). For our purposes it is unnecessary to determine
whether, particularly in view of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), the clear and
present danger test is at most simply only another version of the balancing test, or
whether its real demise is indicated by the fact that it is often not employed even
where "direct" restrictions on speech are involved. See Kalven, supra note 2, at 213-14;
Mvfills v. Alabama, supra note 3. Suffice it to say here that under any view of the First
Amendment there must at least be a "substantial" state interest involved before the First
Amendment interest can be suppressed.
I might add that the minimum rationality standard of the regulatory cases seems to have
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cannot shield that interest from ideological assault. 7 If the state can-
not suppress advocacy of change, I fail to see why it may shield itself
from images which in turn arouse one to question or reject his present
view.68
been abandoned in favor of a First Amendment approach in the equal protection area
insofar as "personal" rights are concerned. Compare cases cited supra note 60 with
Harper v. Board of Election, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
And this development also has a clear foothold in "straight" substantive due process cases,
as the concurring opinions in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 62, make clear.
Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
[67.] The First Amendment is clearly relevant as an additional limitation on State
power.
I can understand ... programs of civic groups and church groups to protect and
defend the existing moral standards of the community. .,. . When speech alone is
involved, I do not think that government, consistently with the First Amendment,
can become the sponsor of any of these movements. .. . [If the first amendment] is
-to mean anything in this field, it must allow protests even against the moral code
that the standard of the day sets for the community.
Douglas, J., dissenting in Roth, 354 U.S. at 512-13. It is here that I think BRNs, op. cit,
supra note 38, errs. He does not attach sufficient importance to the First Amendment
as a limitation on the state's power over the virtue of its citizens.
[68.] Two recent decisions have raised the problem of private immorality in an obscen.
ity context. In Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264 (1966), a husband and wife were
convicted under the federal obscenity statute for mailing negatives and receiving through
the mails developed films of each other posing in the nude. Their convictions were
vacated by the Supreme Court on the suggestion of the Solicitor General that, as a matter
of policy, the statute was enforced only against "repeated offenders." Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred, filed a brief memo-
randum stating that they "would reverse this conviction not because it violates the policy
of the Justice Department but because it violates the Constitution." Id. at 265. Less than
a month later the California Supreme Court reversed on statutory grounds a trial court
instruction that a jury could find the defendant guilty of possessing obscene materials
even if he had prepared the materials without any intent to distribute. In re Klor,
51 Cal. Rptr. 903, 415 P2d 791 (1966). In dicta, the court suggested that a statute
making mere possession a crime would be unconstitutional. Id. at 906, 415 P.2d at 794.
See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 673 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
If one accepts the traditional minimum rationality standard, I cannot take seriously
a notion that either of these convictions if upheld would have violated due process,
Nor does any of the judges address himself in those terms to the questions presented.
I suspect that Justices Black and Douglas in Redmond grounded their opinions on the
view they take of obscenity prosecutions and the First Amendment, particularly since
Mr. Justice Black does not recognize a general substantive due process. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, supra note 62, at 507 et seq. (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Stewart's view
probably reflected his belief that the nude photographs were not hard core pornography.
The California Supreme Court explicitly stressed First Amendment considerations. It
cited Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Roth and relied on Ginzburg for its statement
that no "constitutionally punishable conduct appears in the case of an individual who
prepares material for his own use or for such personal satisfaction as its creation affords
him," and it went on to say:
Nor does such conduct occur if the creator intends to purge the material of any
objectionable element before distributing or exhibiting it. To hold otherwise would
pose grave technical difficulties for the unconventional artist and would, because
of the risk of criminal sanctions, tend to suppress experimental and tentative produc-
tions that might become, in finished form, constitutionally protected communication.
51 Cal. Rptr. at 906, 415 P.2d at 794.
140
Vol. 76: 127, 1966
Obscenity, 1966
II. The 1966 Decisions
1. Memoirs v. Massachusetts9
The Fanny Hill case presented for review an attempt by the Com-
monwealth to suppress John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure.70 History seemed to be repeating itself, for the Massachu-
setts court's determination that Fanny Hill was obscene mirrored
the position it adopted in 1821 when first confronted with the
book.71 (There was some movement, however; on this round, three of
the seven Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dis-
sented.) On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Fanny Hill case was a classic model of the old obscenity pro-
ceeding; the sole question was the nature of the book itself, without
regard to the conduct of those who published or sold it. As Mr. Justice
Brennan noted in writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and Mr.
Justice Fortas, neither party had presented evidence on the "manner
and form of... publication, advertisement, and distribution."72 In the
context, the Supreme Judicial Court's admission that Fanny Hill had
a modicum of social value necessitated reversal; the book could not be
suppressed, wrote the Justice, unless it were found to be utterly with-
out redeeming social value.73 Given the importance Mr. Justice Bren-
nan seemed to attach to this pronouncement, it is surprising that lie
did not go on to consider how much social value Fanny Hill did have,
or even to explain what "social value" is.-
[69.] Supra note 6.
[70.] 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965).
[71.] Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 271 (1821). See Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. at 425 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[72.] 383 U.S. at 417.
[73.] Id. at 419. (Emphasis in original.)
[74.] Mr. Justice Brennan said:
Under this definition, as elaborated in subsequent cases, three elements must coalesce:
it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because
it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or repre-
sentation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social
value.
383 U.S. at 418.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the result on the basis of his dissenting opinion in
Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 421; and he there noted that each of the three criteria announced
by Mr. Justice Brennan must be satisfied, 383 U.S. at 499. Mr. Justice Douglas', concurrence
in Fanny Hill is in 383 U.S. at 424. Mr. Justice Black concurred, 383 U.S. at 421, on the
basis of his dissenting opinions in Ginzburg and Mislahkin, 383 U.S. at 476, 515. Justices
Clark, Harlan and White dissented. Despite Mr. Justice Brennan's failure to discuss the
social value question, his reaffirmation of the test is significant. He explicitly rejected
the view that a book's value is to be "balanced" against its other characteristics, as Mr.
Justice Clark suggested. 383 U.S. at 419-20. Mr. Justice Clark, on the other hand, denied
that the social value test was even a part of the constitutional definition of obscenity.
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Perhaps the abstractness of the judicial discussion stemmed from
the narrow confines of the proffered evidence. The case presented no
questions on a crucial part of the obscenity problem-the commercial
exploitation of erotica. At this juncture Mr. Justice Brennan first con-
sidered, by way of dictum, the possibility that such additional evidence
might have been determinative.
It does not necessarily follow from this reversal that a determina-
tion that Memoirs is obscene in the constitutional sense would
be improper under all circumstances. On the premise, which we
have no occasion to assess, that Memoirs has the requisite prurient
appeal and is patently offensive, but has only a minimum of social
value, the circumstances of production, sale, and publicity are
relevant in determining whether or not the publication or distri-
bution of the book is constitutionally protected. Evidence that the
book was commercially exploited for the sake of prurient appeal,
to the exclusion of all other values, might justify the conclusion
that the book was utterly without redeeming social importance. It
is not that in such a setting the social value test is relaxed so as
to dispense with the requirement that a book be utterly devoid
of social value, but rather that, as we elaborate in Ginzburg v.
United States, . . . where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the
sexually provocative aspects of his publications, a court could
accept his evaluation at its face value. 5
2. Ginzburg v. United States6
The idea that the manner in which the book is marketed-its manner
of production, distribution and advertising-could be dispositive in
a case moved from the level of dictum in Fanny Hill to holding in
Ginzburg. Here the defendent was convicted on twenty-eight counts of
violating the federal obscenity statute by mailing Eros (a hard-cover
Id. at 441-43. His rejection of the social value test as an independent standard is interest
ing; he seems to view social value as an ingredient of prurient appeal, which is to be
determined by striking a balance between the book's erotic appeal and its "message." id.
at 442-43. In this respect, I think Mr. Justice Clark is clearly in error. See People v.
Bruce, 31 Ill.2d 459, 461, 202 N.E.2d 497, 498 (1964). Mr. Justice Clark fails to appreciate
that the underpinning of Roth was that obscenity could be suppressed only because It
was worthless. Accordingly, as Professor Kalven long ago noted: "If the obscene is con-
stitutionally subject to ban because it is worthless, it must follow that the obscene can
include only that which is worthless." Kalven, supra note 15, at 13.
Mr. Justice White apparently takes a view similar to that of Mr. Justice Clark, 883 U.S, at
460-62. What conclusion he draws from treating social value as an aspect of prurient
appeal is, however, unclear from his brief and somewhat unfocused opinion.
[75.] 383 U.S. at 420. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Brennan here cited the
per quod aspects as relevant only to the question of social value, not to those of pruriency
and patent offensiveness. That limitation is abandoned in Ginzburg. See text accompany-
ing note 84 infra.
[76.] Supra note 7.
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magazine dealing in "literary pornography"), Liaison (a bi-weekly news-
letter digesting articles on sex), and The Housewife's Handbook on
Selective Promiscuity (an autobiography recounting the author's sexual
history and philosophy in great detail).77
The Supreme Court upheld Ginzburg's conviction; speaking for
the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan said that in addition to the testimony
centering on the books themselves, there was
abundant evidence to show that each of the accused publications
-was originated or sold as stock in trade of the sordid business of
pandering-"the business of purveying textual or graphic matter
openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of their cus-
tomers."
7 8
Here was the crucial shift in theory. The language quoted by Justice
Brennan is taken from the brief concurring opinion of Chief Justice
Warren in Roth. In that opinion the Chief Justice made plain that in
his view the "conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the
obscenity of a book or picture."79 To put it differently, such prosecu-
tions are concerned with the suppression of dirty businesses, not dirty
books. The Chief Justice had no doubt that destruction of the business
of exploiting erotica lay within the state's power. But, except for a
passing bow at the nuisance theory, Mr. Justice Brennan makes no
effort whatever to identify the state's interest in curtailing this busi-
ness.80 Simply to denounce it as a "sordid business" is not enough."'
One suspects that the Court's consistent refusal to face the question of
[77.] The federal state is 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), which bars use of the mails both to
"every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or
substance," and to every publication describing where the foregoing may be obtained.
See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462-65. For a comprehensive analysis of federal obscenity legislation
see United States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 160-63.
The verdict and judgment of the trial court are reported at 224 F. Supp. 129 (E.D.
Pa. 1963), aFJ'd, 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964). On this and related subjects, Mr. Ginzburg
has provided us with some remembrances of things past in an interview with Playboy
Magazine, July 1966, p. 47.
[78.] 383 U.S. at 467.
[79.] Roth v. United States, 354 US. at 495 (concurring opinion).
[80.] Nor did the Chief Justice in Roth. He simply said: "That there is a social prob-
lea presented by obscenity is attested by the expression of the legislatures of the forty-
eight states as well as the Congress." 354 U.S. at 495. No effort was made to describe the
nature of the "social problem."
[81.] See Epstein, The Obscenity Business, The Atlantic Monthly, August 1966, p. 59:
In its choice of such prejudicial epithets as "pandering" and "the leer of the
sensualist" to describe Ginzburg's activities, the Court seems to be saying that Ginz-
burg's crime was no more than a function of his personality or character:, that he
was a vulgarian, and that therefore he had no right to trade in a market whose
delicate and dangerous products must be limited only to gentlemen and scholars.
Such an ad hominem judgment can hardly have been what the Court intended ....
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the nature of the state's interest rests on its feeling that any such
attempt would open a Pandora's box.8 2
From the foregoing premise, the result in Ginzburg was inevitable.
The "leer of the sensualist" permeated Ginzburg's entire operation,
particularly his advertising.8 3 And this evidence, Mr. Justice Brennan
concluded, was relevant not only to the issue of redeeming social im-
portance as it had been in the Fanny Hill dictum, but to the issues of
prurient interest and patent offensiveness as well.84
At several places in the opinion, the Court indicates that the "vari-
able" or "per quod" factors of production, sale and advertising are
to be considered only in "close" cases.85 This illustrates one of the
difficulties of Roth: if a book must be "utterly without redeeming social
importance" and if one emphasizes "utterly," as Mr. Justice Brennan
does in Fanny Hill,8s it is difficult to imagine how the question of social
value vel non can be analyzed in terms of close cases. "Utterly" seems
to presuppose that the question is not one for dispute-that a book is
not "utterly" beyond the pale unless no reasonable man could fairly
conclude that it had social value, and thus "close cases" should be
accorded constitutional protection.
Moreover, it is interesting to note what the Court found by way
of a close case. Judging by Roth, Eros was not a close case; its "literate,"
artistic style might have saved it. Indeed, on appeal the government
conceded as much. But under the revamped standards that was not
enough. Moreover, the trial judge expressly found that only four of
the fifteen articles appearing in the volume were obscene,"' and even
these findings were by no means incontrovertible. s What Ginzburg
[82.] Not until Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 15, did the concept of "variable" obscen-
ity or obscenity per quod reappear. In Jacobellis, however, the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Clark, dissenting, would have affirmed the conviction of a motion picture exhibitor
at least in part upon the ground that the film's advertising rendered the film itself
obscene. Id. at 201 n.2. But Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring, explicitly rejected the
notion that "the exaggerated character of the advertising rather than the obscenity of
the film is to be the Constitutional criterion." Id. at 198. Moreover, in Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day, supra note 15, at 491, Mr. Justice Harlan, in an opinion announcing
the judgment of the Court, said:
[N]either with respect to the advertisements nor the magazines themselves, do we
-understand the Government to suggest that the "advertising" provisions of [18 U.S.C.
§ 1461] are violated if the mailed material merely "gives the leer that promises the
customer some obscene pictures." . . . Such an atproach to the statute could not
withstand the underlying precepts of Roth. (Emphasis supplied.)
[83.] 383 U.S. at 468.
[84.] Id. at 470-71.
[85.] See, e.g., id. at 470, 471, 474.
[86.] 383 U.S. at 419.
[87.] 224 F. Supp. at 134-36.
[88.] See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 40-46, Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 7. In-
deed, the government conceded that Eros presented "legitimate room for argument." See
Brief for Respondent, p. 27, Ginzburg v. United States, supra.
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tried to do is, of course, evident. Roth required that the question of
obscenity be determined on the basis of the "dominant theme of the
book as a whole." Ginzburg sought to invoke that standard on the
magazine level and to insulate Eros from condemnation by including
within its covers some admittedly protected material, thereby preven-
ting a judgment that, taken as a whole, any volume of Eros was without
redeeming social value. On appeal, the United States did not go so far
as to argue that on the magazine level the Roth standards should be
applied on an article-by-article basis-a position which has much to
commend it.89 Rather, the government argued that
in a publication, like Eros, which is a composite of independent
works tied together only by the fact that they all treat sex in some
manner, a judgment of obscenity as to the whole may thus be
based upon some of its parts-so long as they are significant in
light of the whole .... The opposite rule would, on the other
hand, privilege obscene material because of its physical connec-
tion with non-obscene material.90
The Court's response to the question of Roth's applicability on
the magazine level is, to put it mildly, vague. Mr. Justice Brennan
accepted the trial judge's finding that the inclusion of non-obscene
material was a "deliberate and studied arrangement... for the purpose
of appealing predominantly to prurient interest," and that the record
demonstrated that "Eros was created, represented and sold solely as a
claimed instrument of . . . sexual stimulation."9' But at this point
his opinion suddenly trails off into obscurity:
Petitioners' own expert agreed, correctly we think, that "[filf the
object [of a work] is material gain for the creator through an ap-
peal to the sexual curiosity and appetite," the work is porno-
graphic. In other words, by animating sensual detail to give the
publication a salacious cast, petitioners reinforced what is con-
ceded by the Government to be an otherwise debatable conclu-
sion.92
This, of course, is no answer. The case is not "close" simply because the
[89.] An "obscene picture of a Roman orgyw ould be no less so because accompanied by
an account of a Sunday school picnic which omitted the offensive details." Flying Eagle
Publications, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.2d 307, 308 (1st Cir. 1961). A "person who mails
a picture or pictures obviously obscene does not escape the condemnation of the statute
by placing them in a package with other pictures not obscene." Collier v. United States,
283 F.2d 780, 782 (4th Cir. 1960). This position does not result in the loss of protected
materials because the non-obscene material may be separately published.
[90.] Brief for Respondent, p. 31, Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 7.
[91.] 383 U.S. at 471.
[92.] Ibid.
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government "concedes" that it is. More importantly, Mr. Justice
Brennan does not respond to the argument that the magazine must be
judged as a whole, and that four of fifteen articles (themselves "close
cases") do not render the book obscene.
The Court's sudden attempt to recast its obscenity doctrine in terms
of a limited per quod theory raises problems of the sharpest order.
As the dissents point out,8 3 it seems to fly in the face of the federal
obscenity statute which apparently assumes an in rem approach-i.e.,
that the only question is the nature of the book itself. 4 Certainly
Congress had not explicitly directed its attention to the possible impact
of production and advertising on the question of obscenity. The Court's
construction of the federal statute not only redraws it so substantially
as to suggest a denial of due process for lack of fair warning,95 but is
also inconsistent with First Amendment traditions.
The Court has always insisted that restrictions on speech be embodied
in precisely drawn legislation directed at specifically defined evils,00
and has invalidated statutes containing broad, sweeping language.0 7
Closer to the point here, the Court has reversed a conviction where a
state court has attempted the narrowest "enlargement" of a statute
beyond its plain terms.98 Plainly, the Court's construction of the federal
obscenity statute has little in common with these decisions.
Ginzburg is an attempt to preserve the essence of Roth-that no
serious work may be proscribed as obscene-and at the same time
to permit the states to prosecute the commercial exploiters of erotica.
It purports to rationalize this result by treating the commercial ex-
ploitation of erotica as relevant in a close case, which case, in turn, is
resolved by the defendant's own "evaluation" or "admission" that his
[93.] 883 U.S. at 477 (Black, J.); id. at 493-94 (Harlan, J.).
[94.] Cf. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 28F, reprinted, 383 U.S. at 423-24. See also
383 U.S. at 417 n.3.
[95.] See Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). See also note 98 infra.
[96.] E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
[97.] Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
In Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966), Mr. Justice Douglas said:
Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity. When First Amendment
rights are involved, we look even more closely lest, under the guise of regulating
conduct that is reachable by the police power, freedom of speech or of the press
suffer.
[98.] In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), the Court invalidated a con-
viction under a South Carolina criminal trespass statute forbidding "entry" upon the
lands of another after notice from the owner prohibiting entry, which on appeal the
state court construed for the first time also to include refusal to leave after notice.
Bouie did not advert to First Amendment considerations, but only to the due process
requirement of fair warning. But First Amendment considerations were close to the
surface, since the case involved "sit-ins" protesting racial discrimination.
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work is obscene.9 9 These admissions are generally found in the cir-
cumstances of production and marketing. Over and over the Court
emphasizes that defendant's "evaluation" of his work discloses that it
lacks social value.100 But this refrain alone cannot harmonize obscenity
per se and obscenity per quod. Under Roth, it is hardly self-evident
that a book's social value is affected by the circumstances of its produc-
tion or publicity,101 and to convict a publisher on the strength of his
binding "admission" of obscenity is to indulge in the most naked of
fictions. It is impossible to see why "admissions" should be binding only
in "dose" cases,102 nor why the "admissions" of a manufacturer should
be binding on the First Amendment rights of his potential customers.103
While the Court has abandoned a straight Roth approach, it has
still confined pandering evidence to "close cases"-that is, to cases in-
volving books the social value of which is marginal. Thus we end up
with the strange marriage of obscenity per se and obscenity per quod.
The offspring of this marriage is the following: no serious or complex
[99. See, e.g., 383 U.S. at 472:
[The petitioners] proclaimed its obscenity; and we cannot conclude that the court
below erred in taking their own evaluation at its face value and declaring the book
as a whole obscene despite the other evidence.
[100.] 383 U.S. at 470, 471, 474-75. In Memoirs, Mr. Justice Brennan noted that,
"where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his pub.
lications, a court could accept his evaluation at its face value." 383 U.S. at 420. And
see Mishkin v. New York, S83 U.S. at 510.
[101.] Thus Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, observed:
The sexy advertisement neither adds to nor detracts from the quality of the mer-
chandise being offered for sale. And I do not see how it adds to or detracts one whit
from the legality of the book being distributed. A book should stand on its own,
irrespective of the reason why it was written or the wiles used in selling it.
383 U.S. at 482. And in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 427, he said: "However
florid [the book's] cover, whatever the pitch of its advertisements, the contents remain
the same."
[102.] The leading exponents of variable obscenity see no reason to confine it to
"close" cases:
. [I]n my judgment censorship should not depend upon the intrinsic nature of
the material independent of its audience and method of marketing. Instead, it should
depend upon the manner in which it is marketed and the primary audience to which
it is sold. In this way constitutional protection can be given to the occasional
legitimate distribution of hard-core pornography for scientific purposes, while at
the same time censorship of material that is not intrinsically hard-core pornography
can be permitted when the manner of marketing and the primary audience to which
it is marketed indicate that it is being treated as hardcore pornography-fhat its
function in that setting is to nourish erotic fantasies of the sexually immature. For
these reasons I believe that obscenity should be a variable concept, depending upon
the manner of marketing-the appeal in the marketing-and the nature of the
primary audience to which the appeal is made.
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 59, at 299.
[103.] Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), makes dear that potential
receivers have First Amendment rights independent of their senders. See id. at 307-08
(Brennan, J., concurring). Yet, as a practical matter, the prosecution of the manufacturer
in obscenity cases will foreclose the rights of the receiver as well. See Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 505, 508-09 (1946).
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work may be suppressed as obscene, but a state has the power to sup-
press the business of manufacturing or distributing offensive erotica.
Despite Mr. Justice Brennan's protestations to the contrary,104 Ginz-
burg does result in some loosening of the social value test. In candor,
Roth has proved inadequate and its rationale has been recast.
3. Mishkin v. New York °5
Like Ginzburg, Edward Mishkin was in the business of manufactur-
ing and distributing erotica. But his business was of a somewhat dif-
ferent character. His books dealt not simply with sex, but with "sick"
or aberrational sex. Sex was the focus around which sadistic and maso-
chistic themes were elaborated. These so called "bondage" books can
be found in any drugstore and most bookstores. They include such
titles as Strange Passions, Hours of Torture, So Firm So Fully Packed,
The Violated Wrestler, and Pleasure Parade No. 2. Mr. Mishkin was
convicted on the rather staggering total of 141 counts of hiring others
to prepare obscene books, possessing them and publishing them, all in
violation of the New York criminal obscenity statute. He received a
three-year prison term and $12,000 in fines. The Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction, three justices dissenting. 100
What was only hinted at in Ginzburg comes clearly to light in
Mishkin. Despite the Court's disclaimer, Mishkin's intent was con-
trolling. He sought to engage in the business of pandering, and that
can be proscribed, at least where the books involved possess only
minimal social value. Once again Justice Brennan wrote for the Court,
and his opinion shows the great leeway now permitted the state. He
made little reference to questions of advertising or of "admissions."
Rather, he treated the various parts of the New York statute as a unitary
effort to eliminate the manufacture and distribution of sado-masochis.
tic materials, and on that basis sustained the convictions. Justice
Brennan said:
Appellant instructed his authors and artists to prepare the books
expressly to induce their purchase by persons who would probably
be sexually stimulated by them .... Not only was there proof of
the books' prurient appeal, compare United States v. Klaw, . . .
but the proof was compelling; in addition appellant's own evalua-
[104.] Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 583 U.S. at 420; Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
at 475-76.
[105.] 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
[106.] Id. at 503-04.
148
Vol. 76: 127, 1966
Obscenity, 1966
tion of his material confirms such a finding. See Ginzburg v. United
States .... 107
A few rationalizations may be offered. Unlike Ginzburg, the books
involved in Mishkin did not present a "close" case. They were obscene
per se. This analysis is not contradicted by the opinion. But Justice
Brennan does not analyze the problem in those terms; he is centrally
concerned with Mishkin's conduct, not the status of the books.
Mishkin's argument on appeal was principally restricted to the
meaning of "prurient appeal." He made no effort to argue that his col-
lection had social value. Thus, the Court was able to avoid dealing
with a question of the most crucial importance: what is the "central
meaning" of the social value test? But that question did not escape all
notice. Dissenting in Fanny Hill, Mr. Justice White had pickishly
inquired in passing why the fact that the books had a market did not
demonstrate their social value. 08 But it was left to Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting in Mishkin, to lay bare the unexamined premises of the
majority:
Some of the tracts for which these publishers go to prison concern
normal sex, some homosexuality, some masochistic yearning that
is probably present in everyone and dominant in some.. .. Why
is it unlawful to cater to the needs of this group? They are, to
be sure, somewhat offbeat, nonconformist, and odd. But we are
not in the realm of criminal conduct, only ideas and tastes....
[W]hy is freedom of the press and expression denied them? Are
they to be barred from communicating in symbolisms important
to them? When the Court today speaks of "social value," does it
mean a "value" to the majority? Why is not a minority "value"
cognizable?... If we were wise enough, we might know that com-
munication may have greater therapeutical value than any sermon
that those of the "normal" community can ever offer. But if the
communication is of value to the masochistic community or to
others of the deviant community, how can it be said to be "utterly
without any redeeming social importance"? "Redeeming" to
whom? 09
Mr. Justice Douglas' questions cannot be brushed aside with the flourish
that he misunderstands the social value test-that this test protects only
the interest in the exchange of ideas, not other interests however signif-
icant. But does purely literary or artistic value qualify for protection?
[107.] Id. at 509-10.
[108.] Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 461 (dissenting opinion).
[109.] 383 U.S. at 489-90.
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And even if the interests catalogued by Justice Douglas are not entitled
to protection under the First Amendment, are they not sufficiently im-
portant to warrant some protection under the Due Process Clause? If
so, what are the interests which the legislature found-or might have
found, to use the traditional formulation-which require suppression
of these books? The Court's opinion offers answers to none of these
questions.
III. Obscenity and The Law: Unfinished Business
Plainly, the 1966 obscenity decisions are not the last word on the
relationship between obscenity and the First Amendment. Like Roth,
the 1966 cases could not reconcile the existence of obscenity prosecu-
tions with a principled general theory of the First Amendment. Indeed,
the 1966 decisions merely "adjust" Roth to permit the states consider-
able latitude in suppressing the commercial exploitation of erotica
having minimal social value. Against this general backdrop one must
assess some of the important legal problems which still demand resolu-
tion.
1. Evidentiary and Related Problems
The role of the judge in an obscenity prosecution is a critical
evidentiary question bearing on the scope of First Amendment protec-
tion. The typical obscenity prosecution has been a trial of the book
itself, even though in form a proceeding against the distributor or
retailer. The earliest trials apparently amounted to no more than a
submission of the book to the judge, but recent trials have featured
elaborate evidentiary hearings. Fanny Hill illustrates the pattern. The
Commonwealth introduced the book and the testimony of one margin-
ally qualified expert. The defense introduced notices by literary critics,
and the testimony of professors at Harvard, Brandeis, Williams, and
Boston University, each of whom affirmed Fanny Hill's social value.
Ginzburg involved an even more extensive hearing along the same
lines. The critical question never faced under Roth was the scope of
judicial review given records of this character. In the typical case, the
trial judge heard the testimony as though he were being given a short
course in English literature, but then made up his mind about the book
quite independently of the record evidence. In Fanny Hill the amici
urged the Massachusetts court to reject this approach and direct the
trial judge to dismiss the prosecution so long as the record contained
substantial evidence of the book's redeeming social value, unless the
150
Vol. 76: 127, 1966
Obscenity, 1966
judge could conclude that the record testimony was irrational.110 Any
other standard, they insisted, would give too narrow a protection to
freedom of speech. Their argument is persuasive, and deserves better
treatment than it received in last term's decisions.
The substantial evidence approach won support from two of the
three dissenting judges in Massachusetts,"' and a subsequent opinion
of that court involving Naked Lunch was more favorable. 12 Un-
fortunately, however, the argument that the judge was bound by the
record evidence was not pressed in the Supreme Court. In Ginzburg,
the United States did argue, almost in passing, that the judge must
make an independent determination on the question of obscenity.11 3
The decisions, in turn, contain little explicit discussion of this problem.
Mr. Justice Harlan indicated that he was aware of and rejected the
argument that the judge is bound by the "substantial" record testi-
mony.1 4 Mr. Justice Douglas reached the opposite conclusion.11 5
[110.] See Brief of the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts. Attorney General v.
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 349 Mass. 69, 206
N.E.2d 403 (1965).
[111.] Writing for himself and Justice Spiegel, justice Whittemore summarized the
evidence in favor of the book, and said:
It is not the court's function to consider whether to agree or disagree with the
appraisal of the book by academic witnesses. The controlling circumstance is that
the work is evaluated by representative scholars and teachers of English literature
as a work of some literary and historical significance notwithstanding its patently
pornographic aspects. I construe the concept embodied in the term "social im-
portance" as used by the United States Supreme Court to include the literary and
historical field. Hence, I believe that the publication of this book is protected by the
First Amendment as expounded in the Supreme Court decisions.
349 Mass. at 75, 206 N.E.2d at 407.
[112.] In Attorney General v. A Book Named "Naked Lunch,"- Mass.-, 218
N.E.2d 571, 571-72 (1966), the court said:
As to whether the book has any redeeming social value,... it appears that a sub-
stantial and intelligent group in the community believes the book to be of some
literary significance. Although we are not bound by the opinions of others con-
cerning the book, we cannot ignore the serious acceptance of it by so many per-
sons in the literary community.
See also United States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 170: "[I]t is the record and not our feel-
ings that must control."
[113.] See Brief for the United States, p. 24, Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 7.
See also United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); People v. Fritch.
13 N.Y.2d 119, 125, 192 N.E.2d 713, 717, 243 N.Y.S2d 1, 7 (1963). Mr. Ginzburg referred
to the question of expert testimony, but only in terms of the generally accepted evidentiary
rules governing the use of such testimony. Brief for Petitioners, pp. 42.43. He made no
attempt to develop a constitutional argument at this level.
[114.] 383 U.S. at 460.
1115.] Id. at 427.
t seems to me that the only solution that will full) protect First Amendment values
is a holding that, confronted with substantial evidence of social value either on the
record or even outside it, the trial court must sustain a First Amendment defense. The
suggested standard draws support from-but goes be)yond-the general evidentiary rules
governing the role of expert testimony. While the trier of fact may not "arbitrarily dis-
regard all the expert testimony in the record and rely upon his unsubstantiated per-
sonal beliefs instead of upon evidence," Alvary v. United States, 302 F.2d 790, 794 (2d
Cir. 1962), he may "reject expert testimony and reach a conclusion based upon his]
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While Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Ginzburg does not treat the
problem directly, it did sustain convictions over considerable record
evidence that Eros as a whole, and each of the four questioned articles,
had social value.116 Thus Ginzburg raises the question whether the
book's social value must be "self-demonstrating" if pandering evidence
is to be irrelevant. But if this is so, then record evidence will be of
virtually no significance on the question of social value. In a clear case
(where a book has obvious value), supporting evidence is superfluous,
while in a "close" case (where social value is not obvious), the book will
not be saved by the record testimony if it is being sold by a panderer.
In other words, the only cases where record evidence would really
be helpful are those where it will probably do no good. But this need
not be the practical result of Ginzburg, for the Court did not squarely
address itself to the standard by which the trial judge should evaluate
the record testimony and, despite its implications, it should not be taken
to have settled the point.117
knowledge, experience, and judgment. However, it must fairly appear from the record
that the fact finder had knowledge and experience relative to the subject matter."
Cullers v. Comm'r, 237 F.2d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 1965).
I recognize, of course, that the substantial evidence rule is a principle governingjudicial review of administrative determination of fact, not judicial findings in criminal
trials; and I recognize that at least in federal prosecutions the question of social value
is for the judge, not the jury. But I do not see that either of these observations means
that the suggested standard raises constitutional difficulties. I do not believe that even
the most expansive reading of the "constitutional fact" doctrine of Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932), would result in invalidation of the suggested standard as a violation
of Article III. Crowell dealt with legislative restrictions on judicial review, not with
standards of review asserted to be part and parcel of the Bill of Rights. See generally
JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIVE ACTION 636-56 (1965). I recognize that, un-
like the substantial evidence test in administrative law, see Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); JAm, supra, at 600-15, the proposed standard would require
that the judge look only at the evidence supporting the book. This does not mean, how.
ever, that the judge could never fairly conclude that the expert testimony supporting the
book was insubstantial. See, e.g., Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1966).[116.] For a summary of this testimony, see Brief for Petitioners, pp. 41-42, Ginzburg
V. United States, supra note 7.
[117.] The Court has never addressed itself to the manner in which the trial judge
should evaluate the evidence before him. Instead, it has tended to focus on the question
of the extent to which it (or any appellate court) is bound by the finding of a lower
court or administrative agency that a book is without social value. The Supreme Court
has always considered its function to require it to make an independent judqment on
the social value question, and in the 1966 cases all the parties agreed that this was its
proper role. For a dear exposition of the view see Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 15, at
191 (opinion of Brennan, J.); United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 857(6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Klaw, supra note 4, at 160.
Mr. Justice Harlan, however, dissents from this view in part. He would set aside state
court judgments only in "unusual" cases, 383 US. at 460, where the judgment is a
plainly unreasonable one. "From my standpoint," he says, "the Fourteenth Amendment
requires of a State only that it apply criteria rationally related to the accepted notionof obscenity and that it reach results not wholly out of step with current Americanstandards." Id. at 458. This view rests on Mr. Justice Harlan's on-againoff.agaln "fed.
. .. 
e Is "r "
.gt.a
erahism-hi efusal to cquesce in the view that the First Amendment apples to thestates "in precisely the same fashion" as it applies to the federal government. Compar
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The Court has paid even less heed to evidentiary and appellate re-
view problems stemming from the prurient appeal and patent offen-
siveness criteria. In Ginzburg the United States argued that the Court
should independently review social value, but should accept the lower
court's determination on pruriency and patent offensiveness unless
clearly wrong.118 If adopted, this rule would still leave open difficult
evidentiary questions. Must evidence be introduced on prurient appeal
or is it a proper subject for judicial notice?"0 Must patent offensive-
ness be "so gross as to be self-demonstrating," as Justice Harlan has
suggested? 20 To the extent that an obscenity prosecution involves
other than "hard-core" pornography, expert testimony on patent
offensiveness seems necessary.'-" Certainly the patent offensiveness of
Eros cannot fairly be characterized as "self-demonstrating." But if
evidence is relevant on the question of national'2- community standards,
Harlan, J., dissenting in Fanny Hill, 383 U.S. at 456, 458, with Harlan. J., silently joining
the majority in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1. The definitive rejection
of the Justice's federalism approach came in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964)
(dictum). Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The difficulties with the Justice's
analysis are examined in Kalven, supra note 15, at 25-26. As a practical matter, the
federalism view ends up somewhere between the balancing approach favored by Mr.
Justice Clark and the thesis advanced by the Chief Justice in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra
note 15, at 200-01 (concurring opinion), that obscenity should be treated as a "local"
problem.
[118.] Brief for Respondent, pp. 27-28, Ginzburg v. United States, supra note 7.
[119.] The former is the approach taken in United States v. KMaw, supra note 4. But
Klaw could be restricted to a requirement of proof in case of "deviant" or "esoteric"
materials. Id. at 165. While Mishkin dealt with materials of this nature, it would seem
that each new prosecution involving sadistic, masochistic or "esoteric" materials would
require separate proof of prurient appeal in order to justify restriction. See United
States v. 1,000 Copies of Magazine Entitled "Soils," 254 F. Supp. 595, 597 (D. Md. 1965);
cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). Perhaps, however, a defendant's "own
evaluation" of prurient appeal may be enough under hishkin. Thus, Mr. Justice Brennan
said:
Not only was there proof of the books' prurient appeal, compare United States v.
Klaw ... but the proof was compelling; in addition appellant's own evaluation of
his material confirms such a finding. See Ginzburg v. United States.
383 U.S. at 510.
[120.] Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, supra note 15, at 489.
[121.] Mr. Justice Harlan'sopinions seem to be consistent with this view. In Fanny
Hill he said that he would characterize as 'hard core' that prurient material that is
patently offensive or whose indecency is self-demonstrating .... " 383 U.S. at 457. He
apparently believes that the "patent offensiveness" of hard-core pornography is "erf-
demonstrating," but where the materials are not of that nature, proof must be forth-
coming. Contra, Kalven, supra note 15, at 39. Cf. United States v. 1,000 Copies of Maga-
zine Entitled "Solis," supra note 119.
I find no support for the view recently expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Chemline,
Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 727 (1966), that "appeal to prurient interests"
and "patent offensiveness" are equivalent concepts.
[122.] The various opinions in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 15, -eemed to me to
add up to "national," not "local" community standards. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in
Jacobellis insisted that the "national" community is the relevant inquiry. Chief Justice
Warren reached the opposite result. In Fanny Hill the Chief justice concurred in Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion. Not surprisingly, therefore, the opinion does not refer to the
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what kind of evidence is it?'23 Can the publisher introduce other books
bought and sold in the market place as evidence of what national
standards are? 24 What of book reviews, or sociology studies? The Court
has not addressed itself to any of these evidentiary questions, or, for
that matter, to the proper relation between judge and jury in federal
prosecutions. 25
matter of the appropriate community. It now seems to me that only four Justices are
definitely committed to the view that national community standards control: Black,
Douglas, Brennan and Stewart, JJ. Mr. Justice Fortas may, therefore, be decisive on
this issue.
I might add that my own preference is for the Brennan view. I am not insensitlve
to the difficulty of even believing that such a standard exists, let alone the difficulties
in administering such a standard. But I cannot see that a book may be read in one
community and not another; the First Amendment applies in Arkansas as well as in
New York. My view is that if a book is not too offensive to be read by the residents of
our great urban centers, it is not too offensive to be read by anyone else in the United
States.
[123.] The only direct evidentiary references in the Supreme Court on community
standards are to be found in the concurring opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160, 169 (1959). Mr. Justice Harlan's view is that
"while a state is not debarred from regarding the trier of fact as the embodiment of
community standards, competent to judge a challenged work against those standards,
it is not privileged to rebuff all efforts to enlighten or persuade the trier." Id. at 172.
(Emphasis in original.)
[124.] So far at least, attempts by the publisher to supply the jury with other books
have not met with great success. In Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 939 (Ist
Cir. 1966), Judge NVyzanski said:
The other point deserving of our comment is the refusal of the trial judge to
permit defendant to introduce in evidence a large number of publications cur-
rently available in Rhode Island so that from them the jury could better form its
opinion of community standards. It is, of course, true that what is sold in the
market reflects to some extent community standards. But it is not true that every
item sold is necessarily not obscene. Hence, not every book sold in the market
is admissible to test the obscenity of Lust Job. Nor is a judge required to admit as
a touchstone for the jury even those books which are admittedly not obscene.
The admission of a number of different publications alleged to be comparable to
the publication in issue might make the trial unmanageably complex and lengthy.
The trial judge must be allowed wide discretion as to whether to permit the intro-
duction of such allegedly comparable publications, and as to whether to allow the
witnesses to be examined in detail on publications other than the one directly at
issue. Here the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
In United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 1966), the district
judge permitted defendants to select eight other comparable books allegedly accepted
by contemporary community standards. Only two of the proferred eight were found
comparable, and they were denied admission for lack of proof that they were acceptable
by community standardsl See also People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 305, 183 N.E.2d
661, 663-64, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (1962). United States v. 1,000 Copies of Magazine
Entitled "Solis," supra note 119.
[125.] On the federal level, at least, obscenity cannot be characterized simply as a
question of law for the court, United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160 (D. Ia. 1963), or as
a mixed question of law and fact to be submitted to the jury with instructions, Reed
Enterprises v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Each of the three obscenity
criteria must be separately considered. Despite the Court's lack of direct attention to
the problem, it seems apparent that the question of social value is for the court alone.
To the extent that they are not treated as matters of judicial notice, prurient appeal
and patent offensiveness are for the jury.
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2. Ginzburg at Retail
The potential impact of the 1966 cases is also complicated by the
fact that Ginzburg and Mishkin presented only one facet of the com-
mercial exploitation of sex; they dealt with the suppression at the
manufacturing, not the retail, stage of the business. Mr. Justice Brennan
noted that manufacturers and distributors of erotica were not in any
position to complain about the "residual vagueness" of obscenity.12o
Whether they were or not, the same cannot be said of the retail seller,
as Smith v. California'27 recognized. There the Court invalidated the
conviction of a book seller under an ordinance prohibiting the sale of
obscene books on the ground that scienter was not required. The Court
left open what mental element would suffice, but it recognized that
imposition of strict liability would have disastrous consequences.123
Smith suggests that the states either confine their prosecutions to manu-
facturers and distributors, or adopt a procedure comparable to the
Massachusetts in rem proceedings against the book itself, which allows
criminal proceedings against retailers only after the book is adjudged
obscene. The great advantage of the Massachusetts procedure is that
it eliminates the vagueness otherwise inherent in a prosecutory
scheme. 29 Indeed, I was of the opinion that in rem proceedings were
a constitutional requirement-part of the emerging First Amendment
due process. Otherwise, fear of criminal prosecution would induce
publishers and retailers to avoid the wide danger zone created by the
definitional vagueness of obscenity. This self-censorship could deprive
[126.] 383 U.S. at 475 n.19.
[127.] 3561 US. 147 (1959).
[128.] In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that a stringent
scienter requirement would result in a practical overruling of Roth. 861 U.S. at 160.67.
Under the Roth approach, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's criticism had merit. What was the
mental element required under Roth, and was it required for each of the three Roth
criteria? For example, could the retailer show that he lacked knowledge that the book
appealed to prurient interest or that it substantially exceeded national standards of com-
munity candor? See Kalven, supra note 15, at 37-39. And what of the social Nalue test?
To what extent was the bookseller under any obligation to familiarize himself with the
contents of the book? Under Smith, is ignorance bliss? All these questions remained open
under Roth.
[129.] Massachusetts has a criminal obscenity statute, but as a matter of policy its
Attorney General requires that all obscenity actions begin under the in rem procedure.
The procedure is comparable to a criminal prosecution of a book publisher to the extent
that the publisher is the principal-and generally the only-interienor in the action.
But there is the significant difference that if the book is held obscene, no criminal penal-
ties are imposed, and retailers will be criminally prosecuted only for acti-ities after the
book is adjudged obscene. The Massachusetts procedure is eminently desirable; it has
the least possible impact on First Amendment interests. See AAss. Grx. L h, cli. 272,
§§ 28B-H, set out as an appendix to the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. at 421-24.
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the community of protected materials. But the 1966 cases indicate that
the Court no longer entertains this view. 30
The retailer, however, is not in the same position as the manufacturer
of erotica. As a practical matter he is unable to cope with the residual
vagueness of obscenity, except by means of the most drastic self-censor-
ship.131 Accordingly, if no prior in rem approach is constitutionally
required, Smith should be strongly reaffirmed. The Court will have this
opportunity in a number of cases involving prosecution of retailers
which it has agreed to review. 32 These new cases must, of course, take
into account the sharp impact of Ginzburg and Mishkin on the mens
rea question. Thus, if "appeal to prurient interest" means no more than
sexual "stimulation," is the local seller on sufficient notice because he
is selling Mishkin-type ("bondage") books, whose covers alone spell out
their probable content? And is the cover-or general class of the book-
sufficient to warn the retailer that it lacks social value?133 And, of
course, if patent offensiveness is not properly a matter for judicial
notice, what kind of evidence must the state introduce on the question
of national community standards? In any event, can the retailer defend
on his lack of knowledge of community standards?
The difficulty of the foregoing questions will be aggravated because
of the Court's enlargement of the obscenity statute to embrace the
manner in which a book is advertised. Lacking legislative guidance,
the Court must define the kind of advertising indicating an "admis-
sion" by the publisher that the book is not entitled to First Amendment
protection. Is it sufficient that the cover alone have the "leer of the
sensualist"? 34 What of advertising with the quiet "leer of the sen-
sualist"? 3 5 More to the point, what is the relationship between the
[120.] If Ginzburg and Mishkin concede power to the states to suppress the com-
mercial exploitation of sex, such suppression can be accomplished only at the manu.
facturer-distributor level. Innumerable retail prosecutions seem to me both wasteful
and unfair.
[131.] "One assumes that if the Court itself no longer knows how to define obscenity,
it can hardly expect the clerk to do any better." Epstein, The Obscenity Business, The
Atlantic Monthly, August 1966, p. 59.
[132.] See Redrup v. New York, App. Term, Sup. Ct. N.Y., 1st Jud. Dept. (unreported),
cert. granted, 384 U.S. 916 (1966); Austin v. Kentucky, Civ. Ct. McCracken Co., Ky. (tin.
reported), cert. granted, 384 U.S. 916-17 (1966).
[13.] In this respect, it should be recalled that the advertising itself need not be
obscene. In Ginzburg the government conceded that the advertising was not obscene,
so that a book not itself obscene marketed by advertising also not obscene may result
in a conviction for violating an obscenity statute.
[I24.1 See Books, Inc. v. United States, 358 F.2d 935, 928 (1st Cir. 1966).
(135.] Consider The Story of 0, said to be one of the most pornographic books ever
written. This book is marketed in a plain white cover with the title alone appearing on
the front page. An advertisement showing only the cover of the book appeared in the
New York Times accompanied by a book review describing its erotic qualities. See, e.g.,
New York Times, August 28, 1966, Literary Supplement, p. 21.
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advertising of the publisher or the distributor on the one hand and
that of the retailer on the other?130 Can the advertising of the dis-
tributor be "imputed" to the retailer? Suppose one panders and the
other does not? Whose advertising will be decisive? Or suppose that,
as is sometimes the case, a book appears in both hard cover and paper-
back editions from different publishers, or appears in more than one
paperback edition? Must the prosecution show that the publisher's
advertising affected customers-or potential customers-of the re-
tailer being prosecuted?
IV. Conclusion
Like Roth, the 1966 cases do not succeed in fitting obscenity prosecu-
tions within any comprehensive theory of the First Amendment. But,
in principle, they do permit the states wide leeway to move against the
commercial exploiters of erotica. Their actual impact is, of course,
difficult to assess at this juncture. But, as Professor Emerson reminds us,
repression takes place in a live context, and "those who are assigned
the task already have or soon develop a tendency to pursue it with
zeal."' 3 7 Any ground yielded to the censor unquestionably means that
he will demand more. It is, therefore, safe to assume that the censors
will take the 1966 decisions as further encouragement to go about their
good works.J38 But, as yet, obscenity prosecutions are still of marginal
concern; it still remains unlikely that any "significant" book will be
suppressed. That may not be enough, but it is a good deal.
[186.] In an in rem proceeding against the book under the Masmchusetts obscenity
statute, the book may be banned in partial reliance on the manner of its advertising.
If the advertising ceases, may a retailer then sell the book? On principle, it would seem
so, since the status of the book apart from its advertising has not been adjudicated.
But the wary bookseller may not be so willing as the legal observer to indulge in such
nice distinctions; for him the cost of error is far too great.
[137.] Emerson, supra note 10, at 890.
[138.] And it should be noted that several judges have expressed sympathy with
vigorous censorship programs. Thus, in United States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d
855 (6th Cir. 1966), the court said:
We applaud and share the desire of the learned District Judge in this ca= to
strike at and slow down the ever-increasing velocity of today's commerce in obscenity.
Id. at 865.
The court, however, boggled at the district judge's imposition of sentences totalling 25
years.
In his usual colorful style, Justice Musmanno warns us:
a wide river of filth is sweeping across the nation, befouling its shores and spreading
over the land its nauseating stench. But, what is most disturbing of all, is that per-
sons, whose noses should be particularly sensitive to this olfactory assault do not
smell it at all. I refer to district attorney and prosecuting officers throughout the
nation. Of course, there are a large number of district attorneys in the country
who are doing their duty and doing it well, but a larger number of prosecuting
officials are shrugging unconcerned shoulders at this violent asault on law, morality
and decency.
Address by Justice Musmanno, October 23, 1965. Compare United States v. Kaw, supra
note 4; and see Kalven, supra note 15, at 45.
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